Abstract We investigated management of wildlife, vation at the local level, thus undermining the intended incentive system. Because local wildlife protection habitat and the hunting programme in Aksai County,
Introduction
.
We assessed the status of the Kharteng International Sustainable use as a means to conserve vulnerable wildlife resources relies on 'use' creating incentives Hunting Area (KIHA), focusing on argali Ovis ammon in Aksai Kazak People's Autonomous County, Gansu toward 'sustainability' (Freese, 1997 (Freese, , 1998 . Conservation is achieved, despite the deliberate loss of individuals, Province, China. Foreign hunters can legally purchase permits to kill argali, blue sheep Pseudois nayaur, Tibetan because the population and its required habitat must be protected adequately to allow indefinite persistence of gazelle Procapra picticaudata and goitered gazelle Gazella subgutturosa, although the other species are considered both. Hunting of highly valued species is one example of sustainable use (Swanson, 1992) . Southern African less valuable than argali by hunters and are priced lower by Chinese authorities. Nationwide hunting quotas for countries have the most experience of this, oCering expensive hunts to foreign hunters (Metcalf, 1994; Lewis argali are established by the OBce of Wild Fauna and Flora Protection of the State Forestry Administration in & Alpert, 1997) . Sustainable hunting has also been suggested for certain highly valued ungulates of Western Beijing, in consultation with the Endangered Species Scientific Commission of China (Jiang, 2000) . Quotas China (Cai et al., 1989; Stiver, 1989; Harris, 1993) , and was adopted by Chinese authorities in the late 1980s.
are applied to entire provinces, rather than to management areas or population units (Jiang, 2000) . Argali Some people argue that trophy hunting does little to help wildlife populations, and instead provides avenues quotas for Gansu during 1997-99 were 15, 15 and eight, respectively (Jiang, 2000) , divided among the three for business transactions between wealthy foreign hunters and cash-strapped government bureaux (Cunha, 1997;  hunting areas within Gansu (KIHA, Subei Hashiha'er and Subei Mazongshan). Schaller, 1998) . Others argue that such programmes are Argali are the largest of wild sheep, and the impressive horns of adult males and the diBculty of approaching these wary and secretive animals makes them particularly Richard B. Harris (Corresponding author) and Daniel H. Pletscher, prized by trophy hunters (Stiver, 1989; Harris, 1995 Hunting quotas for argali were developed without all areas likely to be used by argali. We travelled through as much habitat as possible by vehicle and ascended advice from field staC in Aksai or Gansu provincial administrators, and the rationale and methodology for to ridges or peaks by foot to scan visible areas, using binoculars and telescopes. When we observed an argali developing the quotas were not published. From 1990 to 2000, 33 argali rams were killed in KIHA (Fig. 2) . group, we determined our own position using a Global Positioning System, mapped the approximate position During this time only one argali hunter was unsuccessful. Fifteen blue sheep and 16 gazelles (all males) were of the group on 1:50,000 topographic maps, and judged observations as duplicates of previously counted animals also legally killed during this period, although hunter success rate was not documented because the intention based on distance from other observations and group composition (Harris et al., 2001) .
and eCort of hunters to take these species was often variable and unclear. During August 2-13 2000, we used a rapid rangeland reconnaissance method to qualitatively estimate pasture
The international hunters originated from Andorra (1), Austria (2), Canada (2), Denmark (2), France (2), conditions (Harris & Bedunah, 2001) . We conducted open-ended interviews with livestock herders to deterGermany (2), Italy (1), Mexico (5), Spain (3), Switzerland (1), and USA (6). All the argali killed by hunters in mine their opinions on land conditions, long-term changes in grazing and wildlife numbers, and historic KIHA were male, and no losses from wounding were reported during 1998-2000 (information on possible patterns of livestock management. We selected herders that were based near the areas where we conducted wounding was unavailable for earlier years). The mean age (as estimated by AWPS staC from horn annuli) of range reconnaissance, although we also interviewed herders that were known to have the longest history of rams killed was 8.2 years (SE=0.2, n=33). The age of males killed did not change significantly with time tenure in KIHA. We conducted the interviews outside, as the herder was tending his or her herd, or in the (F=1.93, df=1, 31, P=0.17; Fig. 3a) . The average length of the longest horn of rams killed by hunters was herder's tent. We asked questions about herd structure, movement of livestock, condition and desirability of 110.6 cm (SE=1.4), with no detectable change through the time period (F=0.02, df=1, 31, P=0.90; Fig. 3b ). spring and winter camps, livestock products, marketing of livestock and livestock products, risk management, Prior to 1997, AWPS staC produced c. 10 public information notices (in both Chinese and Kazak) to publicize water resource use, length of time herding, depredation of livestock by wild predators, cooperation with other laws against poaching. These notices, painted on wearresistant stone, were placed in strategic locations along herders, and grazing management concerns.
We obtained information on administration, finances, the primitive road system in and around KIHA. By 2000 most of the notices required repainting and maintenance. and management of the hunting area from unpublished documents and informal interviews with AWPS staC AWPS staC also conducted informal educational sessions with local pastoralists. No patrols were made to speci- (Harris & Pletscher, 1997; Harris, 1999) . We used data collected by AWPS staC on age and size of rams killed to fically deter or apprehend poachers, and AWPS staC spent little time in the field other than that associated examine trends over time. We tested the null hypotheses that there was no eCect of time on age and horn length with preparing and conducting hunts. of rams killed using least-squares linear regression. We also discussed our observations and views with AWPS staC, and benefited from their insights. Open-ended interviews and discussions with local staC and oBcials were conducted in Chinese by RBH; some interviews with pastoralists were translated into Chinese from Kazak. The exchange rate was approximately Chinese ¥ 8.2=USA $1 during the study period.
Results
During surveys in 2000 we documented at least 255 argali in KIHA, and speculate that perhaps up to 300 were present (Harris et al., 2001) . Most of the pastoralists that we interviewed held the opinion that the argali Bedunah, 2001 ). The number of horses, which have a disproportionate impact on vegetation and soils, was much higher than the number required for transportation (Harris & Bedunah, 2001) .
Itinerant placer gold miners, mostly from eastern Qinghai province, were present within KIHA during our survey and, according to interviewees, this has been true for over a decade. Where placer mining had taken place, vegetation was usually lost entirely. In areas where vegetation had regrown we observed an absence of palatable grasses, such as species of Stipa and Poa, and a dominance by unpalatable, and occasionally poisonous, species such as Clematis tangutica and C. florida. Until 1999, placer miners were generally small groups (10-30) of entrepreneurs, working independently. In August 2000 we counted 12 large dredge boats in the Kharteng river upstream from KIHA, and were told that approximately 200 people were camped nearby in connection with this commercial operation.
Hydrologists from Dunhuang, camped on the Kharteng River during the summers of 1999-2000 and documenting the river's flow rate, told us of plans to build a dam near this location, impounding the Kharteng River. The plans include construction of an aqueduct and numerous pumping stations to move water from where it would be used for agriculture.
Some of the data points represent more than one individual.
During 1998-2000, argali hunters were charged US $12,000 per hunt ($10,000 per person per hunt if two or more people hunted together), plus a trophy fee of Neither AWPS staC nor we documented any poaching incidents involving argali during 1997-2000, and we $9,500 if successful (i.e. $21,500 or $19,500 per trophy; CWCA, 1998). Blue sheep could be added for $2,500 believe that subsistence argali poaching had been reduced to inconsequential levels by the late 1990s. In December each and gazelle for $1,200. An additional $500 was charged for domestic airfare and accommodation, $500 1998, however, government oBcials from neighbouring Subei County killed approximately 20 wild yaks Bos per day beyond 8 days, and $900 for each non-hunting accompanying person and an additional $180 per day if grunniens and several Tibetan gazelles, and evidently intended to sell the meat in nearby Dunhuang. The the hunt required more than 5 days (CWCA, 1998) . During 1998-2000 all hunters used foreign booking oCenders were apprehended with the assistance of AWPS staC and were subsequently tried, convicted and agents as intermediaries. As most overseas booking agents retained a 15-20% commission, the funds reaching imprisoned.
Approximately 50,000 domestic sheep and goats, China were 80-85% of the published prices. The oBcial in-country breakdown of funds from international and 2,000-4,000 horses and camels grazed in Jianshe Township, potentially aCecting argali habitat. Intensity hunters was 20% to the federal level, 30% to the provincial level, 5% to the prefecture level, and 45% to the and patterns of livestock grazing substantially limited the argali population through competition for similar county level (Harris, 1995; Liu, 1995) . UnoBcially, 16% was first deducted at the national level for support of plant food species and temporal and spatial displacement (Harris & Bedunah, 2001) . During winter and the Import/Export and CITES oBces. Thus, proceeds to the county level were 32% (=0.85×0.84×0.45×100%) spring when forage options were limited, argali and domestic sheep and goats in close proximity subsisted of that paid by the hunter. At the county level 50% of funds was retained for on similar plant species (Morisita index of overlap C l =0.98; 1.00 is perfect dietary overlap, see Horn, 1966) . general expenditure by the county treasury and the remainder was provided directly to wildlife protection Domestic herds appeared to displace argali from areas that provided an optimum combination of forage availstations. Thus, c. 16% of the fees paid by hunters were available to the AWPS, from which field expenses for ability and quality, and predator avoidance (Harris & hunts were also paid (salaries and overheads of the accounting but, according to AWPS staC, payments to Aksai County during 1998-2000 were late and incomwildlife stations were paid by the county treasury). Based on the costs of our own fieldwork and information plete. As of August 2001 the AWPS had received only about half of the funds due it from hunts that occurred provided by AWPS staC, we estimated field expenses at c. $2,400 per hunt, which is approximately equal to 16% during 1998-2000 (i.e. c. 8% of monies expended by hunters). As a result, during 1999 AWPS went into debt of the hunters' fees. Thus, under this funding scheme, AWPS receive only enough to cover hunting services by approximately ¥20,000 and was forced to take out a loan from the county government to continue operations. (Table 1) .
Beginning in 1998 Aksai County altered this arrangeBy October 2000, AWPS staC informed us that their budget had become suBciently stressed that payment ment, and began allowing AWPS to keep all countylevel funds. At this time, however, the county ceased of their salaries had been delayed pending receipt of funds owed to them for hunts conducted during 1998-2000. supporting AWPS, and began treating it as a private enterprise, although it remained oBcially a government
We have no reason to suspect AWPS of wasting money or spending inappropriately, and believe the shortfall bureau. Salaries and overheads become the responsibility of AWPS (i.e. paid entirely by hunters' fees), and taxes came entirely from failure of higher government levels to transfer funds due. were also levied on its income and property. This partial privatisation produced little change in total funding available to AWPS, but increased their dependence on a steady supply of overseas hunters.
Discussion
No provision existed for funds to be channelled to government levels below the county (e.g. township
Although Liu et al. (2000) published a figure of 0.431 argali km−2 for KIHA, neither source, methods, area level). Monetary benefits to pastoralists living where hunts occurred were limited to horse rental provided surveyed, nor time period for this estimate were provided. Thus, there were no quantitative surveys from by four pastoral families with seasonal pastures nearest to the preferred hunting areas. Thus there were no direct which to infer recent trends in the argali population in and around KIHA. We believe, however, that before the financial benefits to the majority of people whose family economies were potentially aCected by the presence establishment of trophy hunting the argali population was below the carrying capacity of the habitat because of wildlife.
Hunters remitted funds only to the in-country agents of the history of subsistence poaching. Upon arrival in the Kharteng area in the 1930s, Kazak herders had few at the national level, who then transferred them to the provincial level. We were not permitted to see details of livestock, and supplemented their diet with wild game (Gansu Forestry Bureau, 1990) ; given the popularity of their the Kharteng area (Schaller, 1998; Harris et al., 2001) , and thus commercial poachers, most of whom live meat, argali were probably also heavily hunted at this time. Most local pastoralists thought argali have now in eastern Qinghai, have not had reason to operate in KIHA or elsewhere in Aksai. Poaching by gold miners increased compared to previous levels, but we were generally unable to determine the reference point from is always a threat because they are often armed and usually camp in remote locations. In addition, their mining which the pastoralists made this assessment; thus, some may have used the low numbers of the early 1960s as a activities result in extensive and substantial damage to the stream beds and riparian areas in which they work. reference point.
Male argali killed by hunters have tended to be These areas have a disproportionate importance for both wildlife and livestock because they support more diverse relatively old, and the age of the rams taken did not decrease over time, suggesting that the harvest rate was and productive plant communities than do the adjacent slopes. Itinerant gold miners are generally disliked by not excessive. Caveats to concluding from these data that the harvest has been sustainable are: (1) deterlocal people in Aksai, but the County oBcially welcomes them because the county government obtains funds mination of argali age from horn annuli counts is imprecise, particularly among older age classes; (2) lack from a strategically located tax station. It is unlikely that the amount of available plant of a trend in a closed population is suggestive of stability, but the locations from which the rams were material is limiting for argali, but the animals probably have diBculty obtaining combinations that produce taken has varied, leaving the possibility that older rams from one portion of the argali range were depleted, optimal mixtures of energy and protein (Hobbs & Swift, 1985) because of the high levels of domestic grazing. and rams taken later represented expanding hunting pressure; (3) the distribution of size and age of rams
We believe it likely that displacement from preferred habitats caused by the movements of domestic sheep taken depends on the skill of the hunters in killing the individual rams suggested by AWPS hunting guides herds also negatively aCected survival or recruitment of argali. (in some cases the rams that were taken were not the largest available); (4) cohort eCects can potentially mask Grazing lands within KIHA are all under long-term contract to family units herding livestock (Harris & relationships between age at harvest and population trend (Carey & Dehn, 1998) . Nevertheless, these data Bedunah, 2001). Although these lands formally belong to the government, they are not subject to any specific tend to support the conclusions of Harris et al. (2001) that trophy harvests of five or fewer per year are unlikely land-use regulations. The livestock industry in this part of China operates on a private-property mimicking to cause local population declines or to disrupt normal breeding behaviour. basis and, except for requiring seasonal movements of domestic herds and levying taxes, government authority Poaching is usually considered to be the greatest threat to argali populations in Western China (Schaller, does not extend to specific control of management activities on these lands. 1998). Some of the success in reducing poaching in KIHA can be attributed to eCorts of AWPS staC and the The planned reservoir within KIHA would inundate habitat that was preferred by, and may be critical for, presence of the hunting programme, but three other factors have also tended to reduce poaching of argali in argali during winter and spring (Harris & Bedunah, 2001 ). We do not know whether it would obstruct Aksai County, independent of enforcement from AWPS staC: (1) Argali were displaced seasonally by migratory movements that currently take place between summer/ autumn argali habitats north and south of the river. domestic sheep herds (Harris & Bedunah, 2001) , and thus pastoralists rarely had easy access to argali because of Regardless, the potential for considerable disturbance and poaching caused by the rapid influx of thousands the disturbance created by their own activities; (2) poaching by local residents was made virtually impossible in of workers (together with the necessary infrastructure to support them in this remote area where there are 1998 when all guns were confiscated county-wide by public security oBcials, prompted by an incident of presently only a handful of migratory pastoralists) is obviously high. violence and not by concerns about poaching; (3) in Hunting programmes can be categorized either as their absence. Thus, despite its current limitations, we recommend that designation of KIHA as an international essentially wildlife conservation programmes, in which funds from hunters are used to partially or entirely hunting area be maintained, because we doubt that national, provincial, area or county governments would oCset the running costs, or as essentially business enterprises, where an otherwise rare species exists provide funding should hunting be terminated. Alternatively, KIHA could be designated as a nature locally in suBcient abundance to justify generation of employment and profits. The two diCer in fundamental reserve, but by itself this is unlikely to improve the prognosis for argali. The neighbouring Hashiha'er huntobjectives and incentive structures, and thus in the type of support merited from the international conservation ing area in Subei County is included within the Yanchiwan Nature Reserve, but Hashiha'er appears to community. In conservation-based hunting programmes the local staC are wildlife managers who also oCer be managed similarly to KIHA, and is facing similar threats. Nature reserve designation for this portion of hunting services, whereas in business-based programmes the local staC are travel agents and guides who hope Subei County has not limited grazing, mining, poaching or legal trophy hunting, all of which appear to conthat, by engaging in business activities, wildlife will automatically be well managed.
tinue at levels similar to those seen in the nominally unprotected KIHA. The diBculty of managing nature KIHA is primarily a business enterprise, rather than a wildlife conservation programme, because most power reserves where funding is insuBcient and economic concerns predominate is not unique to western Gansu and benefits are held at the national level, and those with the most ability to manage the populations and or provincial level reserves, but has been documented throughout China and for national-level reserves (WWF, habitat (AWPS) are provided with few tools and funds. Because benefits and responsibilities are inverted, the 1998; Liu et al., 2001) . In China the policy of conserving wildlife through a link between business success and conservation success is weak and conservation is not assured. market-based approach will almost certainly continue. On this basis the recommendations that we make here Current policy looks towards market forces to assist in conservation, and AWPS is treated and expected to require no additional funding from government sources, and existing funding from international hunters could operate like a profit-making business. AWPS will prosper if it succeeds in its fundamental objective of providing continue to act as the main financial support. We recommend that: (1) all hunting fees received in-country high-quality hunts. This, in turn, necessitates conservation of the argali population within KIHA. The hoped-for should be made to AWPS directly, rather than filtered down from various higher-level government units; incentive structure links success of the quasi-business enterprise directly to the health of the population that (2) other government units should be reimbursed by AWPS only for documented expenditures made in supis hunted.
This approach is reasonable, given the existing port of the hunting programme, allowing AWPS to spend the remaining income on wildlife conservation, habitat political, economic, and historical constraints, but is flawed because AWPS is controlled and limited by protection, and minimizing conflicts with other economic activities in KIHA; (3) exclusive rights to critical wildlife higher government authorities in ways that would not apply to a business enterprise operating in a free-market habitats within KIHA should be purchased by AWPS so that argali are prioritized over livestock where necessary, economy. Firstly, AWPS has no authority to market or sell hunts; hunters are assigned by the provincial domestic herds should be purchased in key areas, and sold for slaughter or to pastoralists living in less sensitive hunting company, and AWPS has no guarantee that their conservation eCorts will be rewarded with more areas, and those pastoralists bought out by the programme should be assisted in finding new employment; business. Secondly, AWPS has no authority to limit the number of hunters arriving, even if a prudent free-(4) Aksai County should be reimbursed by AWPS for lost tax income resulting from reductions in livestock market strategy calls for curtailing harvest in the shortterm to assure a sustainable oCtake. Thirdly, AWPS is herds; (5) Frequent patrolling should be initiated to ensure that pastures purchased and reserved for wildlife are not not in direct control of the receipts from the services it provides; payments are often late and some never used by domestic livestock or otherwise compromised, and to deter poaching; (6) Biennial population surveys arrive at all, and AWPS thus has no power to budget or allocate resources in a way that will assure its own should be initiated (based on the model provided by Harris et al., 2001) , and an annual quota of trophy argali success. Fourthly, AWPS has no control or influence over the quantity or quality of habitat that provides the rams be set as 2% of the total number of argali (all sexes and ages; Harris, 1993) counted during the survey; (7) taxes basis of the wildlife population.
The existence of the motivated and capable AWPS on domestic livestock should be used to discourage pastoralists from keeping large herds of horses. staC provides more potential for conservation than would
